Citizens’ assemblies and policy reform in New Zealand by Hayward, Janine
Page 70 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 9, Issue 2 – May 2013
Janine Hayward
Citizens’ Assemblies 
and Policy Reform  
in New Zealand
Janine Hayward is an Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Otago. 
Her research interests include Treaty politics, constitutional politics, comparative indigenous issues 
(Australia and Canada), public policy, environmental issues, local government politics, and the media 
and politics.
In 2011 New Zealand held a referendum on the future 
of its voting system for general elections. Following the 
referendum, the current voting system was retained, and 
the Electoral Commission reviewed the system and made 
recommendations for change in late 2012. In early 2013 the 
government’s response to those recommendations is still 
awaited. Recognising the importance of this process, this 
article considers an alternative approach to electoral reform, 
drawing on the experiences of Canada’s and Holland’s use of 
citizens’ assemblies in the electoral policy-making process. 
The article considers the merits and limitations of citizens’ 
assemblies for electoral reform, particularly in the New 
Zealand context. It proposes the form and function of a 
citizens’ assembly on electoral 
reform in New Zealand to 
complement the reform 
process. Overseas experience 
demonstrates that, with some 
caveats, a citizens’ assembly 
remains a possibility for 
electoral reform and other 
constitutional policy change 
in New Zealand in the future. 
New Zealand’s electoral referendum and 
MMP review
At the 2011 general election a referendum 
asked New Zealand voters two questions: 
first, ‘should New Zealand keep the Mixed 
Member Proportional (MMP) system?’; 
and second, ‘if New Zealand were to 
change to another voting system, which 
voting system would you choose?’ Voters 
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were offered the following options: first 
past the post (FPP), preferential voting 
(PV), single transferable vote (STV) 
and supplementary member (SM). In 
the lead-up to the referendum, the New 
Zealand Electoral Commission was tasked 
with the role of educating the public on 
the referendum, on MMP and on the 
alternative voting systems offered. 
The voters’ responses to the first 
question triggered one of two subsequent 
steps. If more than half of voters taking 
part had preferred not to keep MMP, 
a second, binding referendum would 
have been held at the general election 
in 2014 to decide between MMP and 
the most popular alternative system, 
FPP. In fact, 56% of all participating 
voters wished to keep MMP. Under the 
Electoral Referendum Act 2010, this 
result triggered an independent review 
of MMP by the Electoral Commission, 
beginning in 2012. The commission 
was required to consider the following 
aspects of MMP: the two thresholds for 
the allocation of list seats; the effects of 
the ratio of electorate seats to list seats on 
proportionality in certain circumstances; 
the rules allowing candidates to contest 
an electorate and be on a party list, and 
list members to contest by-elections; 
and the rules for ordering candidates on 
party lists. Mäori representation and the 
number of members of Parliament were 
excluded from the review. The review 
provided multiple opportunities for 
the public to express views, including 
two chances to make written and oral 
submissions, as well as opportunities to 
attend public hearings and to participate 
in hearings by video/telephone for 
those remote from major urban centres. 
In November 2012 the commission 
made its final recommendations to 
government (Electoral Commission, 
2012); government has yet to respond to 
these recommendations.
Under New Zealand’s unwritten 
and non-entrenched constitution, 
Parliament enjoys supreme sovereignty; 
the triennial election of representatives to 
the House is arguably the most powerful 
constitutional check on the executive. It 
is prudent, therefore, to reflect on the 
strengths and limitations of the electoral 
reform process. How can we ensure, most 
importantly, that the choice voters made 
on this important issue was an informed 
one? New Zealand’s use of referenda for 
electoral reform is innovative (Lundberg 
and Miller, 2012). But can ordinary people 
make enlightened political decisions 
through referenda? We know that most 
citizens today are not sophisticated 
political creatures; in fact, they are poorly 
informed and barely interested in politics 
(Fournier et al., 2011).
A desire to engage citizens 
meaningfully in policy-making and re-
form led to innovative experiments in 
Canada and the Netherlands with 
collective, deliberative citizen decision-
making for electoral reform. These 
experiences provide evidence that, under 
the right circumstances, citizens can be 
trusted to learn, deliberate and make 
reasoned decisions about their own 
government. Acknowledging the possible 
benefits of citizens’ assemblies, this article 
will consider whether a citizens’ assembly 
might have been used in New Zealand’s 
recent reforms, and, consequently, 
whether such an assembly might be worth 
considering for similar constitutional 
reform in New Zealand in the future. 
Citizens’ assemblies for electoral reform
Between 2004 and 2007 in British 
Columbia and Ontario (Canada) and in 
the Netherlands, governments established 
citizens’ assemblies on electoral reform to 
design the best electoral system for their 
respective communities. In the broadest 
sense these three citizens’ assemblies tested 
important democratic ideals: participatory 
government, the active involvement of 
ordinary citizens; deliberative democracy, 
education and debate among ordinary 
citizens; and epistemic democracy, the 
idea that, taken collectively, ordinary 
citizens can make reasonable choices. All 
three cases required a group of citizens 
to learn about electoral systems in order 
to recommend a preferred system. In 
Canada the assemblies’ recommendations 
were put to binding public referenda; 
in the Dutch case a recommendation 
was delivered to government. Each 
assembly preferred a different electoral 
system. The Dutch assembly had 143 
members, and operated from March to 
November 2006. Early in the process 
the assembly opted to retain the existing 
proportional representation system and 
identify modifications to it. The assembly 
submitted these recommendations to 
a newly-elected government. In April 
2008 that government announced that 
it would not implement the assembly’s 
proposals. The Ontario assembly, which 
operated from 2006 to 2007, was the 
smallest of the three, with 103 members. 
Ontario, like British Columbia, was using 
the FPP electoral system; the assembly 
recommended a change to a form of MMP. 
This was put to a binding referendum 
in October 2007 (in conjunction with a 
general election). The proposed change 
failed to meet the necessary threshold of 
voter support (Fournier et al., 2011).
The criteria used to judge the ‘success’ of 
these assemblies are, obviously, varied and 
contested. All three processes delivered on 
schedule and within budget. But if success 
means implementing change, clearly 
these processes are found wanting. As 
discussed below, however, the assemblies 
themselves, as a process of citizen en-
gagement and learning, have much to 
recommend them as policy-making tools. 
Under New Zealand’s unwritten and non-
entrenched constitution, Parliament enjoys 
supreme sovereignty; the triennial election of 
representatives to the House is arguably the most 
powerful constitutional check on the executive.
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The British Columbia citizens’ assembly 
has been particularly well documented 
and is thus a useful case to examine in 
more detail to consider its usefulness in 
policy making. The assembly grew from 
British Columbian premier Gordon 
Campbell’s commitment to tackle public 
apathy in electoral politics (Carty, 2004). 
In 2004, 160 citizens in British Columbia 
were ‘near-randomly’ selected to spend 11 
months assessing the province’s electoral 
system. The government asked these 
citizens, known as the British Columbia 
Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, 
to consider whether the existing first-past-
the-post system could be improved upon, 
and, if so, to recommend a new electoral 
system. This recommendation would be 
put to all British Columbian voters in a 
referendum, and the results legislated 
by government if the public voted for 
change. Described as an ‘innovative 
gamble’ (Warren and Pearce, 2008, p.xi) 
and a ‘bold public policy initiative of 
historic proportions’ (Elton, 2003, p.234), 
this citizens’ assembly was the first of its 
kind in Canada.
Citizens for the assembly were 
selected through random ballot using 
information available on the electoral 
role, but the process ensured gender 
equity and regional distribution: one 
man and one woman were selected from 
each of the 79 ridings (electorates) in 
British Columbia. The selection process 
was ‘skewed’ to ensure the assembly 
reflected the spread of age in the British 
Columbian population. Two self-
identifying aboriginal citizens were added 
through a subsequent random selection 
process when it was clear that none had 
emerged through the first process. 
The 11-month assembly process was 
in three phases. Throughout the year 
participants devoted an estimated 30 
hours per month to their assembly work, 
for which they were paid an honorarium 
and expenses. For the first few months 
of the year they learned about electoral 
processes over six weekends. Experts in 
electoral systems spoke to the assembly, 
and the citizens read widely on the topic 
and engaged in group discussions within 
the assembly. A second, consultative phase 
included 50 public hearings and meetings 
across the province, attended by assembly 
members. A website received written 
submissions and proposals. Members 
then came together for a weekend to share 
and digest what they had learned, before 
moving into the final, deliberative phase 
of the process. Over six weekends the 
members identified core values, and key 
features of an electoral system, in order 
to identify appropriately the option best 
suited to the needs of British Columbia. 
A ‘significant movement of opinion’ 
occurred during the deliberation phase, 
when preferences shifted from the mixed 
member proportional voting system to 
the single transferable vote. This has 
been described as a ‘preference reversal 
that was rooted in the understandable 
reconsiderations fostered by the 
deliberative process itself ’ (Fournier et 
al., 2011, p.78). 
In December 2004 the assembly 
issued a report recommending that 
the province adopt STV. In May 2005 
this recommendation was put to a 
referendum: STV would be adopted if 
60% of the province-wide vote, and a 
majority in 60% of the electoral districts, 
voted for STV. In the event the proposal 
passed in 77 out of 79 districts, meeting 
the second threshold. But it gained 57.7% 
of the province-wide vote and therefore 
fell just short of the 60% overall support 
required. With such a close result, the 
provincial government agreed to hold a 
second referendum on the same proposal 
in May 2009, to coincide with the 
provincial election. This time STV failed 
decisively, receiving 39% support across 
the province, and a majority in no more 
than 9% of the districts (Fournier et al., 
2011, p.8). 
Lessons from citizens’ assemblies
The British Columbia citizens’ assembly, 
along with the cases in Ontario and the 
Netherlands, being well documented1 
reveal the benefits and limitations of a 
citizens’ assembly as a policy-making tool. 
Broad principles of design can be drawn 
from these three cases. Assemblies must be 
randomly selected, and seen to represent 
(in terms of composition) the community 
from which they are drawn. Assemblies 
must have sufficient time to learn, to 
consult with the public and to deliberate. 
This requires extensive infrastructure, 
adequate resourcing, and time (Fournier 
et al., 2011, p.151). The assembly’s mandate 
must be very clearly specified, and it must 
focus on an appropriate question. The 
assembly must establish principles by 
which to judge the options available. 
Overall, in the literature there is 
enthusiasm that ‘democratic agents of 
democratic renewal can be designed’ 
(Warren and Pearse, 2008, p.6). An 
assembly is considered a model of how to 
‘engage and empower citizens to deliberate 
and decide on selected public policy 
questions’ (Institute on Governance, 2007, 
p.2). Despite the assembly engaging only 
a tiny proportion of voters, there is also 
optimism that, with appropriate time and 
resources, citizens can be motivated to 
learn about and make reasoned decisions 
on complex matters. Analysts found an 
‘elevated degree of involvement among 
participants’ in all three assemblies, with 
extremely high levels of engagement, 
participation and attendance throughout 
the process (Fournier et al., 2011, p.149). 
In Ontario, the average absence over the 
12 weekends was just two members (in a 
group of 103), which ‘speaks strongly to 
Citizens’ Assemblies and Policy Reform in New Zealand
Despite the assembly engaging only a tiny 
proportion of voters, there is also optimism that, 
with appropriate time and resources, citizens can 
be motivated to learn about and make reasoned 
decisions on complex matters. 
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members’ commitment to the project’ 
(Rose, 2007, p.15). Ordinary citizens 
acquired an extensive knowledge and 
understanding of electoral systems 
throughout the process, achieving 
decision-making that appeared to be of 
a remarkably high quality. These findings 
have led assembly architects to conclude 
that ‘citizens have the capacity to shed 
their apathy, overcome their ignorance, 
and reason conscientiously about an 
unfamiliar and complex political issue’ 
(Fournier et al., 2011, pp.149-51).
Finally, it is important to note that 
a deliberative assembly offers a collective 
agreement (after the three phases of 
learning, consultation and deliberation) 
rather than individual preferences 
expressed through a referendum. As 
Cutler et al. (2008, p.166) argue, a 
referendum alone offers voters little 
‘opportunity or incentive to pause 
from ordinary pursuits to consider the 
question closely by themselves, much less 
in the company of others’. The collective 
preferences of assembly members showed 
stability, or changed in ways that could be 
explained. Moreover, the three assemblies 
chose different electoral systems as a 
consequence of the different features 
of their respective communities. Each 
assembly’s decisions were not considered 
to be driven by a small number of vocal 
or influential members, and neither did 
the staff or academic experts participating 
in the process appear to influence the 
outcomes (Fournier et al., 2011, p.150).2
But how much trust did the wider 
public have in the decision-making of 
these assemblies? In other words, ‘do 
voters trust the judgment of citizen 
representatives, even if … [the voters’] 
understanding of the proposal is 
not informed by a similar process of 
education and deliberation?’ (Warren 
and Pearse, 2008, p.17). In the case of 
the British Columbia assembly, it was 
found that the citizens’ assembly drew 
its legitimacy – in its own eyes and in 
the eyes of the wider public – from the 
near-random selection process and from 
the belief that they were a representative 
sample of the general public (Fournier 
et al., 2011, p.148). In British Columbia 
in particular, the fact that the assembly 
was considered to resemble the province 
demographically seems to have led the 
‘populist voters’ to trust the assembly and 
to support its recommendation.3
The Canadian and Dutch experiences 
also reveal the limitations of assemblies 
as policy-making tools. The effect of 
assemblies on participants beyond their 
specific mandate, for example, should 
not be overstated. ‘Participation in 
these assemblies did not have a major 
impact on individuals’ general outlooks 
towards political actors, fellow citizens 
and themselves. It may have created 
more interested and involved individuals, 
but it did not produce “better” citizens’ 
(Fournier et al., 2011, p.125).
Furthermore, an assembly ‘ought 
to be used sparingly under exceptional 
circumstances’ (ibid., 2011, p.155). This 
discussion has focused on assemblies for 
electoral reform, but, more broadly, any 
electoral or constitutional question is a 
possible case for an assembly, particularly 
questions that should not be left to self-
interested elected officials (Ferejohn, 2008, 
p.213). ‘It makes no sense for government 
… to decide the rules of the game [of 
government]’ (Vander Ploeg, 2003, p.221). 
As Jonathan Rose, chair of the Ontario 
assembly, explains: 
Assemblies are ideal when politicians 
have a conflict of interest, when 
there is no obviously right answer or 
when it is important to hold a public 
conversation on an issue. Because 
they are independent of government 
and have a transparent process, 
they are imbued with authority and 
legitimacy – the hallmarks of their 
process. Since they have no agenda, 
their recommendations are viewed 
as sound ones by stakeholders, 
politicians and the public. (Rose, 
2008)
A citizens’ assembly for New Zealand?
In 2007, when the Electoral Finance Bill 
was proposed, the Green Party noted that 
it was not appropriate for self-interested 
members of Parliament to consider this 
matter, and suggested an amendment to 
create a citizens’ assembly (New Zealand 
Parliament, 2007). The proposal was 
rejected by the House after a brief and 
dismissive debate. National MP Wayne 
Mapp questioned the value of a citizens’ 
assembly, saying: ‘[e]veryone in this 
Chamber is a citizen. Every person here 
has been elected. It is an assembly. This is 
the place where we debate the legislation.’ 
Green MP Metiria Turei spoke in defence 
of the idea and objected to Mapp’s 
dismissive attitude, saying: ‘I take note 
of Mr Mapp’s very poor analysis of the 
importance of having the public engaged 
in such a process.’ She also criticised 
the government’s quick rejection of a 
process to engage the public in campaign 
finance reform. National MP Tim Groser 
questioned the capacity of an assembly 
to grapple with the complex issues 
surrounding campaign finance. He said: 
This is a bill of such complexity that 
the Minister herself has admitted 
she does not understand it. It is a 
bill of such complexity that Helena 
Catt, the chief executive of the 
Electoral Commission, says she does 
not understand it. But at least these 
two persons drawn from each of 
the electorate lists – at random, … 
– will be able to clarify it. … This 
The experiences of citizens’ assemblies in Canada 
and the Netherlands demonstrate that ... MPs may 
have been too quick to dismiss the capacity of 
ordinary citizens to learn about and make informed 
decisions concerning complex policy issues ...
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amendment would be an absolute 
disaster, and we implore … the 
Labour Party not to go there.
The experiences of citizens’ assemblies 
in Canada and the Netherlands demon-
strate that, at the very least, these MPs 
may have been too quick to dismiss the 
capacity of ordinary citizens to learn 
about and make informed decisions 
concerning complex policy issues such as 
voting systems and, presumably, electoral 
finance law. Imagine for a moment that 
New Zealand MPs had greater confidence 
in New Zealand voters, and had agreed 
to legislate to create a citizens’ assembly 
for New Zealand’s recent electoral reform 
process. How might this assembly be 
constituted, and what might its mandate 
and terms of reference be?
As in British Columbia, New Zealand’s 
electoral roll could be used to randomly 
select and invite voters to participate in the 
assembly process. Those who indicated a 
willingness to be involved would proceed 
to a selection process which could 
ensure, through near-random selection, 
participants from each electorate who 
represent the New Zealand population in 
relation to age, gender, and ethnicity in 
relation to Mäori voters. If two citizens 
from each electorate (including the seven 
Mäori electorates) were selected, this 
would produce a 140-person assembly. 
Presumably most meetings would be in 
Auckland, due to the population spread. 
But the population size and geography 
of New Zealand makes the logistics of an 
assembly practical and possible.
The assembly itself could be given a 
very tightly focused objective and terms 
of reference such as those identified by 
the recent referendum and the subsequent 
MMP review. The process would follow 
the established three phases of learning, 
public consultation and deliberation. 
The assembly could be asked to decide, 
first, whether New Zealand ought to 
keep MMP. If it decided that it should, as 
the referendum did, the assembly could 
subsequently review specific features 
of MMP (as the Electoral Commission 
has done), and make recommendations 
to Parliament. If the assembly decided, 
however, to propose a change to another 
system, it could review the alternatives 
and recommend the best alternative 
voting system. This decision might then 
be put to a referendum for all voters. 
The limitations of citizens’ assemblies 
ought not to be forgotten, however, and 
two questions arise from this theoretical 
assembly for New Zealand. The first is 
the problem of integrating a citizens’ 
assembly with a public referendum. This 
was done with both Canadian assemblies, 
and in both cases the assemblies’ 
preferences (for change) were defeated 
at the referendum. As one commentator 
notes, ‘how can it make sense to … 
place the … wisdom [resulting from 
an assembly] at the disposition of a 
feckless and ignorant majority’ (French, 
2012, p.67) via referendum? Put another 
way, why place so much emphasis on 
the learning and education of citizens 
and the value of their reasoned opinion 
and then place the final decision with 
a process which clearly does not meet 
those principles? Given New Zealand’s 
history of referenda in electoral reform, it 
is almost impossible to imagine the New 
Zealand public accepting a decision made 
without a public referendum, regardless of 
how legitimate they consider the findings 
of an assembly. The other possibility, 
as in the Dutch case, is for an assembly 
to make its recommendations directly 
to Parliament. This ushers in a second 
problem the assembly sought to avoid, 
of self-interested politicians making the 
final decision and ignoring an assembly’s 
recommendations (as was the Dutch 
experience). 
Conclusion
Citizens’ assemblies have proven to be 
useful policy tools overseas in electoral 
reform. They show that citizens have the 
capacity to overcome political apathy, 
and learn and make reasoned choices 
about complex policy issues. It is worth 
reflecting on the benefits to New Zealand 
of using a citizens’ assembly for important 
constitutional policy reform, such as 
the recent electoral reform process, or 
other constitutional issues arising in the 
future. Assemblies have their limitations, 
and challenges remain in integrating 
assembly recommendations in a decision-
making process. But New Zealand’s 
small population base and geographical 
space, combined with ‘heightened levels 
of intimacy, community, access and 
accountability’ in politics (Lundberg and 
Miller, 2012, p.4), make it ideally suited 
for citizens’ assemblies to promote, at the 
heart of the policy process, an informed, 
robustly-debated policy choice by New 
Zealand citizens.
1 Richard French expresses reservations that the analysis thus 
far has come from those involved in the assembly process. 
He notes the ‘celebratory, at times euphoric, tone to the 
Warren and Pearse collection’ and the ‘more balanced view’ 
of the subsequent edited collection by Fournier which reviews 
all three cases. See French (2012), pp.65 and 73.
2 Lang (2008, p.86), however, questions this.
3 The composition of the assembly has been the subject of 
some criticism and questions about who ought to be included 
for deliberative assemblies to be truly ‘representative’ of their 
communities. See in particular James (2008), pp.107-8.
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